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Asia is fast becoming the largest recipient of Japan's foreign direct investment (FDI). Within 
the Asian region, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has been the major 
investment destination of Japan. In the manufacturing sectors, however, the investment 
flows from Japan to ASEAN—with Thailand being the largest recipient—has been declining. 
In contrast, Japan’s FDI in the services sectors in ASEAN has been growing rapidly. The 
recent phenomenon of the Singapore Shift in Japan's FDI in the ASEAN services sectors 
proves interesting. The prominent strategy of  Japanese  companies  is to establish a 
commercial presence in Singapore, which they expect to be the “hub” of Southeast Asia, 
thereby enabling them to supply services to the entire ASEAN region. The magnitude of the 
Singapore Shift varies for every services sub-sector. By comparing transport and logistics 
with finance and insurance industries, this paper considers the critical determinants of the 
Singapore Shift.  
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1.  INTRODUCTION  
The  2004  World  Investment Report of  the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD 2004) provides a comprehensive assessment of the “shift toward 
services” in foreign direct investment (FDI). So far, the trend seems to have been 
strengthening, rather than weakening. The services sector has evolved as a significant field 
in international trade as well as in international investment. 
While there is a large body of economic analysis on the determinants of FDI in Asia, most 
analysis focuses  either on the aggregate  amount of FDI or  on  FDI in the manufacturing 
sector. It is surprising that FDI in services has not attracted increasing attention, given that 
the  recorded  growth  is  much higher in comparison with  the manufacturing industry  or 
primary industry. As has been pointed out by Banga (2005), traditional FDI theory based on 
manufacturing sectors (“FDI in goods”) may be unable to capture the distinctive features of 
FDI in services.  
The research focus of this paper is on FDI in services. It is particularly important to analyze 
FDI in services in a regional context. The distribution of services FDI among countries within 
a region should be analyzed in light of regional services and investment agreements.
1 While 
it is argued that regional/bilateral investment agreements increase investment flows to the 
region from countries outside the region  (Velde and Besemer 2005), a critical question 
remains unanswered: Which member country of a regional agreement attracts more FDI 
from outside? Services industries are usually highly regulated by government agencies and 
in particular investments  in services sectors are  usually strictly regulated,  unlike the 
manufacturing sectors where  the  offering of investment incentives  is  common  practice. 
Regulations  on investment usually have negative impacts on FDI inflows in the services 
sectors (Kox and Nordas 2007). Thus, the recent proliferation of regional economic 
agreements to liberalize services trade and investment in the region is dramatically altering 
the environment in which international investments  occur.  It has become possible for 
companies outside the region to provide services across the region, if the region has a 
regional economic agreement covering services and investment and the companies have a 
commercial presence in at least one country in the region.
2
To examine the impact of regional agreements covering services and investments on the 
geographical distribution of services FDI, this paper analyzes Japan’s services FDI in each 
of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries. Such an empirical focus 
is crucial because Japan has been one of the largest investors in the world, and ASEAN has 
been the largest FDI destination of Japan. Moreover, given recent dramatic changes in 
regional governance of  services and investments under  various regional economic 
agreements in Asia, analyzing FDI within Asia can be an effective way to assess the impact 
of regional services and investment commitments on FDI in services. As we will see below, 
Japan’s services FDI in ASEAN members is undergoing dynamic structural changes, which 
in itself is an interesting fact, deserving the attention of policymakers and scholars.  
  
The next section briefly reviews the literature on geographical determinants of FDI and 
explains the methodology used in this paper for analyzing FDI in services. The third section 
provides an overview of Japan’s services FDI in ASEAN. The trend in ASEAN’s share of 
Japan’s FDI, the share of services in Japan’s FDI in ASEAN, and the shares of sectors in 
Japan’s FDI will be analyzed. The fourth and fifth sections contain a detailed empirical 
analysis of Japan’s FDI in ASEAN in the transport and logistics sector, followed by the 
                                                 
1 It should be noted that services investment is usually covered by services trade agreements, while there are 
many bilateral investment treaties (BITs) covering services as well. 
2 This happens when a regional agreement adopts the “substantial business operation” rule with regard to the 
rule of origin in the services sectors. Most ASEAN’s agreements, including the ASEAN Framework Agreement 
on Services (AFAS) and the ASEAN-Japan EPA, adopt substantial business operation rules. For the details, 
see Fink and Nikomboriak (2007).  ADBI Working Paper 267    Hamanaka 
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finance and insurance sector. In each section, the share among ASEAN members in Japan’s 
FDI is first reviewed and then the magnitude of the Singapore Shift in the sector is assessed. 
Japan’s investment policies at the company-level are also reviewed. An examination of the 
regulatory situation in each ASEAN member for each sector follows, taking into 
consideration  the driving force behind the Singapore Shift. The sixth section gives an 
account of policy implications of the empirical findings in the preceding sections. The final 
section concludes, presents the main findings of the study, and suggests directions for future 
research.  
2.  LITERATURE REVIEW AND RESEARCH 
METHODOLOGY OF THE STUDY 
2.1  Limits of Existing Literature on FDI Distribution 
In analyzing services FDI in a regional context, we should pay close attention to the 
geographical distribution of FDI among neighboring countries, especially among member 
countries of a regional agreement. While some literature suggests that the formation of 
regional agreements increases FDI flows to a region, the question of which member country 
of a regional agreement receives more FDI from outside and whether the distributions are 
“zero-sum” have not been studied sufficiently. There are some studies that tackle the 
question of the geographical distribution of FDI, but their consideration of regional 
agreements is limited. Liu, Chow and Li (2007) argue that the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC) does not crowd out FDI from ASEAN countries on the grounds that ASEAN countries 
received above-average FDI from OECD countries while FDI in the PRC was below-average 
in relative terms against its economic fundamentals. Likewise, though the methodologies 
employed were different, Eichengreen and Tong (2007) analyzed if FDI in PRC deviated 
from FDI flows to other countries and concluded that FDI in the  PRC and other Asian 
countries are actually complimentary because both are included in the same production 
networks. They admit, however, that FDI flows to the PRC replaced FDI flows to OECD 
countries to a degree. Meanwhile, Chantasaswat et al. (2004) find that the level of the PRC’s 
FDI is negatively related to ASEAN’s FDI share in total Asian FDI, though they confirmed 
that the correlation is positive if the levels of the PRC’s and ASEAN’s FDI are compared.   
While those findings are interesting, this study sheds light on three main limitations. First, the 
empirical debate on the geographical distribution of FDI in Asia has focused predominantly 
on whether FDI in the  PRC  occurs at the expense of other Asian countries,  whereas 
competition for FDI among ASEAN countries has attracted little attention. The reason for 
this, perhaps, is the  premise  that ASEAN economies are complementary because of 
linkages between their production networks and, therefore, FDI in one ASEAN country would 
automatically have a positive effect on its FDI in other ASEAN countries, especially in the 
case of manufacturing. However, it is also very plausible that ASEAN countries are actually 
competing for FDI to a certain degree, especially in services sectors.  
Second, most studies deal with aggregated or manufacturing FDI, and conclude that FDI in 
ASEAN and the PRC are indeed complimentary (Chantasaswat et al. 2004; Liu, Chow and 
Li 2007). However, determinants of services FDI may be different from manufacturing FDI. 
One interesting finding by Eichengreen and Tong (2007) is that determinants of FDI are 
different between manufacturing and services. Using disaggregated data, they argue that the 
correlation between Japan’s FDI in the PRC and ASEAN is not high in the case of several 
services sectors. This implies that, in the case of some  services  sectors, the factors 
determining Japan’s FDI in PRC and in ASEAN are independent of each other. The nature 
of the geographical dispersion of services FDI could be different from that of FDI in the 
manufacturing sector.  ADBI Working Paper 267    Hamanaka 
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Third,  the important question as to which participating country in  regional  services 
investment agreements receives relatively large amounts of FDI from countries outside the 
region has not been analyzed adequately in the existing literature. Recent studies identify a 
positive relationship between investment agreements in the region and a region’s inward FDI 
from a country outside the region as well as  a  positive
 relationship between investment 
agreements and bilateral investment flows between members (Velde and Bezemer 2005 for 
the former, and Salacuse and Sullivan 2005 and Tobin and Rose-Ackerman 2002 for the 
latter). In analyzing FDI within Asia, one should bear in mind that the Asian region is replete 
with agreements covering investment issues. Services trade and investment have been and 
will be substantially liberalized within ASEAN in some sectors in the coming years. In 
addition, services trade and investment between Japan and individual ASEAN countries are 
also liberalized under their respective bilateral Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) 
with Japan, but to a different extent and at different speeds. This can lead to complications in 
making investment policy decisions based on geographical considerations of Japanese 
companies.  
It is beneficial to briefly review industry-level studies on the determinants of FDI, though they 
are very limited. Most literature focuses on the determinants of FDI in the financial sectors. 
These studies suggest that market size and manufacturing FDI are important determinants 
of FDI  in financial services  (Yamori 1998; Moshirian 1997). Buch (1999) assesses the 
significance of the liberal regulatory regime governing FDI in financial sectors and finds the 
correlation to be positive. However, it should be noted that the regulatory regime is treated 
as a dummy variable (e.g., whether a country is a member of a regional agreement), without 
qualitative assessment of actual regulations and commitments.  
There is only a limited amount of econometric  literature  on  the determinants of FDI in 
services sectors other than financial services. Among such studies, Kolstad and Villanger 
(2008) find that market size and FDI in the manufacturing sectors are important variables in 
explaining transport FDI based on regression analysis. Meanwhile, based on the corporate-
level analysis of a Norwegian maritime company, Kind and Strandenes (2002) conclude that 
Singapore’s aggressive policy to attract maritime services suppliers is one of the contributors 
to the large amount of transport FDI in the country.  
2.2  Methodology  
This paper analyzes the recent development of Japan’s outflows of FDI in the services 
sector at the sector-level from the angle of regional investment integration schemes. The 
paper specifically addresses the question of which countries in ASEAN receive Japan’s 
services FDI. The paper focuses on the  Singapore Shift phenomenon recently observed 
among Japanese companies with services operation in Southeast Asia. In several services 
industries, Japanese companies  concentrate their investments in Singapore among the 
ASEAN economies. This study examines the magnitude of the Singapore Shift  in each 
services industry and why such shift occurs in a particular services industry, rather than in 
other services industries.  
This study does not attempt to quantify the precise significance of each determinant of 
Japan’s FDI in ASEAN in each services sector by regression analysis. This would be very 
difficult because of the lack of time series services investment data at the disaggregated 
level and the difficulty of quantifying services regulations and commitments. Rather than 
conducting regression analysis based on an incomplete data set, this study employs eclectic 
methods, namely a combination of data analysis on available investment statistics, case 
studies on investment policies at the company-level, and qualitative assessment of services 
regulations and commitments under regional agreements. 
First, to assess the situation of Japan’s services FDI in ASEAN, we will analyze not only 
investment data but also actual corporate behavior and consider if what can be observed at 
the data level is consistent with the investment policies at the company-level. Simply ADBI Working Paper 267    Hamanaka 
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analyzing investment data is insufficient to assess if the Singapore Shift occurred. Company-
level anecdotal examples in each  industry are necessary to understand what exactly is 
happening in Asia in terms of investment flows.  
Second, the examination of possible factors to explain the Singapore Shift requires careful 
qualitative analysis. Services  FDI  should be analyzed  taking  full account of  the new 
environment of regional integration in Asia. ASEAN has a regional investment agreement 
and at the same time each ASEAN country (as an individual party) is engaged in an 
investment agreement with Japan. But using simple governance indicators as a proxy 
variable of investment environment or converting the regulatory status into binary variables 
is not recommended. Detailed qualitative analysis of each country’s regulatory status and 
services commitments in each services agreement at the sub-sector level is necessary.  
In summary, this paper attempts to draw a sketch of the recent dynamic development of 
Japan’s services FDI in ASEAN using available investment data and anecdotal company-
level examples, and to attribute those changes to the factors associated with regulatory 
development under economic agreements in a qualitative manner.  
3.  OVERVIEW OF JAPAN'S FDI IN ASEAN 
3.1  Investment Data 
The critical problem that most research on services faces is the lack and/or inconsistency of time 
series data. This paper mainly uses figures in the FDI section of the Balance of Payment (BOP) 
Statistics of Japan. The Japanese finance ministry and central bank started to release BOP-
based FDI figures in early 2005, replacing the old Foreign Direct Investment Statistics (FDIS).  
However, because of the difference of compilation methodologies between the two statistical 
data sets, data before and after 2005 cannot simply be combined and then analyzed together for 
the following reasons: First, BOP figures are more comprehensive and are based on financial 
transactions, whereas FDIS is a compilation of figures reported by investors covering only 
investments over 100 million yen. In the case of FDIS, investors are not obligated to report 
transactions with a value of less than 100 million yen. As a result, the total amount using BOP-
based data is much larger than that of FDIS-based data. Second, the compilation of BOP 
statistics is based on accounting rules. Therefore, outward investment (investment abroad) in the 
BOP can be recorded as a negative figure. This happens when, for example, Japanese capital 
assets in Thailand decline due to withdrawal of investment (disinvestment). By contrast, data in 
FDIS is always positive, because this is the total of reported figures of implementation or 
approval of new investment (withdrawal of investment in the past is not captured in the FDIS). 
Finally, in the case of FDIS, fiscal year (FY) figures that cover the months of April to March of the 
next year are normally used because Japanese companies usually produce and implement their 
budgets on a fiscal year basis.  
The analysis below basically relies on BOP-based FDI figures available after 2005. Since BOP-
based data are available for only a short period, the paper sometimes refers to the data before 
“2004FY” (fiscal year 2004) using FDIS to examine the trend before 2004FY, without comparing 
the level of BOP-figure and FDIS-based figures (since comparing share composition in BOP-
based statistics and FDIS-based statistics would be unwise). Data and figures using FDIS are 
contained in the Appendix. Unless otherwise stated, we assume that the 2010 figure is double 
that of the value reported for the first half of 2010, since data is available only for this part of the 
year.
3
                                                 
3 For figures referring to the first half of 2010 here, the data values are not doubled.  
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3.2  Japan’s FDI in ASEAN, PRC, and India 
Asia is the largest destination of Japan's FDI (manufacturing and non-manufacturing), based 
on the average regional share of Japan’s total outward FDI in 2005–2009. Asia accounts for 
26.2%, North America accounts for 26.0%, and Western Europe accounts for 23.2%.  
Among Asian countries, ASEAN as a group and the PRC are the two major recipients of 
Japan’s FDI (see Table 1). ASEAN received 600–700 billion yen of Japanese FDI in total, 
which was as much as Japan’s FDI in the PRC. While Japan’s FDI in ASEAN has slightly 
declined in recent years, overall, it has maintained a high level. Despite the rapid rise of the 
Indian economy, Japan’s FDI in India remains smaller than its FDI in ASEAN and the PRC.  
Looking at disaggregated sector-level figures, we can find interesting trends in Japan's FDI 
in Asian countries. In the manufacturing sectors (food; textile; lumber and pulp; chemicals 
and pharmaceuticals; petroleum, rubber, and leather; glass and ceramics; iron, non-ferrous 
and metals; general machinery; electrical machinery; transport machinery; and precision 
machinery), the trend in Japan's FDI in ASEAN has generally declined. This is in sharp 
contrast with Japan's FDI in the PRC, which has remained roughly at the same level over 
the past five years. Because the differing trend in Japan’s FDI between PRC and ASEAN, 
Japan’s manufacturing FDI in the  PRC has become larger than its FDI in ASEAN. 
Meanwhile, Japan’s FDI in India has recorded a growing trend, but the level itself is still 
much lower than FDI in ASEAN (a jump that can be observed in Japan’s FDI to India in 2008 
is due solely to the increase in FDI in chemicals and pharmaceuticals investments
4
The situation is totally different in the case of the services sector. Here, the seven sub-
sectors related to services will be analyzed. The non-manufacturing sector in Japan's BOP-
based FDI statistics consist of ten sub-sectors, seven of which are services-related 
(construction; transport; communication; wholesale and retail; finance and insurance; real 
estate; and other services), while the other three are non-services (farming and forestry; 
fishery and marine products; and mining).
).  
5 Although the trend in Japan's services FDI in 
ASEAN has been growing overall, it has been volatile. ASEAN receives a larger amount of 
FDI than the PRC in the services sector. However, it should be noted that Hong Kong, China 
has been a major recipient of Japan’s services FDI as well. Japan’s services FDI in India is 
increasing, but the level itself is still low (a jump that can be observed in Japan’s FDI in India 
in 2009 is due solely to the increase in FDI in the communications sector
6
                                                 
4 In 2008, Japan's FDI in India in the manufacturing sector was 512 billion yen, while FDI in chemicals and 
pharmaceuticals was 416 billion yen. 
). 
5 Since investment in the mining sector (e.g., oil and gas) is typically large and volatile, it is important to make a 
distinction between non-manufacturing and services. 
6 In 2009, Japan's FDI in India in the non-manufacturing sector was 271 billion yen, while FDI in communications 




Table 1: Japan’s FDI in Asia (billion yen (share)) 
    2005  2006  2007  2008  2009 
2010 
(1st half) 
ASEAN  Total   558    809    917   652   659    254   
    Manufacturing  432 (77)  755 (93)  563 (61)  400 (61)  385 (58)  154 (61) 
    Non-manufacturing  126 (23)  54  (7)  354 (39)  252 (39)  273 (41)  99 (39) 
      Services  130 (23)  35  (4)  234 (26)  175 (27)  257 (39)  94 (37) 
PRC  Total   726    717    730   670   649   225 
       Manufacturing  563 (78)  567 (79)  493 (67)  502 (75)  462 (71)  165 (73) 
    Non-manufacturing  163 (22)  150 (21)  238 (33)  168 (25)  188 (29)  60 (27) 
      Services  146 (20)  127 (18)  229 (31)  155 (25)  184 (28)  60 (27) 
Hong Kong, 
China  Total   196    176   133   134   152    41 
    Manufacturing  75 (38)  85 (48)  41 (30)  65 (49)  25 (16)  34 (83) 
    Non-manufacturing  122 (62)  90 (51)  92 (69)  69 (51)  127 (84)  7 (17) 
      Services  117 (60)  83 (47)  91 (69)  68 (51)  87 (57)  7 (17) 
India  Total   30     60   178   543   344    49 
    Manufacturing  39 (130)  47 (79)  141 (79)  512 (94)  73 (21)  23 (48) 
    Non-manufacturing  -9 (-31)  12 (21)  38 (21)  31  (6)  271 (79)  25 (52) 
      Services  -7 (-23)  12 (21)  38 (21)  31  (6)  273 (79)  25 (52) 
Source: Japan’s BOP statistics, various issues 
Because Japan’s FDI in the manufacturing sector has been declining while Japan’s FDI in 
services has been increasing, the share of the services sector in Japan's FDI in ASEAN has 
increased significantly in recent years (Table 1). The share of the services sector in Japan's 
FDI in ASEAN was around 20% in 2005, but this declined in 2006. The share rose again to 
around 25% in 2007 and 2008 and reached a level slightly lower than 40% in 2009. While 
the data in 2010 covers only the first half of 2010, the increasing trend in the share of 
services seems to be continuing. The same can be said in terms of both FDI levels and 
shares for FDIS-based data prior to 2004FY, even though data are not comparable between 
the periods before and after 2005. The share of services in total FDI increased from around 
25% in 2000FY to 35% in 2004FY (see Appendix, Figure A).   
3.3  Japan's FDI in individual ASEAN countries 
A country-level analysis is necessary to understand the dynamics of Japan's FDI in ASEAN. 
However, country shares vary significantly from sector to sector. In the manufacturing sector, 
Thailand is the major  recipient of Japan's FDI of  the  ASEAN countries (Figure 1). On 
average, Thailand's share was roughly 40% of Japan's total manufacturing FDI in 2005–
2009, but it has been declining. Singapore, Malaysia
7
                                                 
7 A jump in Malaysia’s share in 2006 was due to investment in the electronic machinery industry only. In 2006, 
Japan's FDI in Malaysia’s manufacturing sectors was 332 billion yen, while FDI in electric machinery was 279 
billion yen.  
, Indonesia, and the Philippines follow 
next. Recently, Viet Nam has also been becoming a major recipient of Japan’s 
manufacturing FDI. Thailand’s dominant share is consistent with the fact that Thailand is 
becoming the manufacturing center for operations of Japanese manufacturers, such as in 
the automobile industry. Nevertheless, Thailand’s share has been declining over the last few 
years, due in part to the country's political instability. This decline in Japan's FDI in Thailand 
is one of the major factors explaining the overall decline of Japan's FDI in the manufacturing 
sector in ASEAN. Based on the analysis using FDIS (Appendix, Figure B), we can confirm 

































Source: Author’s calculation based on Japan’s BOP statistics (various issues) 
 
In the services sector, Singapore is the largest recipient of Japan's FDI among ASEAN 
countries, with a growing overall trend despite its volatility (Figure 2). Singapore recorded 
negative figures in several services sub-sectors, with the wholesale and retail sector being 
the largest negative contributor in 2005 and 2006. However, its share in Japan's services 
FDI in ASEAN climbed to 50% in 2007, dropped to 20% in 2008, and surged back to 70% in 
2009. Singapore’s share in the first half of 2010 was roughly 50%. This increase in Japan's 
FDI in Singapore in recent years is the largest contributing factor explaining the overall 
increase in Japan's services FDI in ASEAN. The shares of Thailand, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, and Viet Nam are roughly equal. Using FDIS 2000FY–2004FY data, the same 
trend can observed in Japan’s services FDI, except in 2003FY (Appendix, Figure C). 































Source: Author’s calculation based on Japan’s BOP statistics (various issues) 
3.4  Major Services Industries in Japan's FDI in ASEAN  
While Singapore is the largest recipient of Japan's FDI in the services sector in ASEAN, the 
geographical distribution of FDI varies for each services sub-sector. Thus, we need to 
analyze the country composition of each sub-sector. Figure 3 shows the share of each 
services sub-sector in Japan's total services FDI in ASEAN. The shares are computed 
based on the average FDI outflows between 2005 and 2009. Finance and insurance takes 
nearly half of the total share, while the share of transport is one quarter. Communications 
has the third highest share, accounting for about 10% of Japan's FDI in the services sector. 
The share of other services sub-sectors is marginal, even though the magnitude of increases 
in their levels is remarkable.  ADBI Working Paper 267    Hamanaka 
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Source: Author’s calculation based on Japan’s BOP statistics (various issues) 
FDI in the finance and insurance, and transport sectors has increased significantly, although 
the rates of increase have been volatile. The average amount of Japan’s FDI in ASEAN in 
those sectors in 2005–2009 is as follows: (i) transport machinery—124 billion yen; (ii) electric 
machinery—117 billion yen; (iii) finance and insurance—85 billion yen; and (iv) transport 
services—43 billion yen. Therefore, finance and insurance, and transport are already as 
important as the transport machinery (such as automobiles) and electric machinery sectors 
in terms of the value of Japan’s FDI. In light of the above analysis, given the significance of 
the services sector, a picture of Japan's FDI in ASEAN that fails to take account of the 
services sector would be incomplete. 
The next two sections will analyze two major sub-sectors in the services sector: transport, 
and finance and insurance. These sub-sectors are chosen because, first, they are the two 
most dominant sub-sectors in Japan’s FDI, and second, because the trends observed in 
those two services sectors are contrasting in terms of Japan's FDI distribution across 
ASEAN countries.  
4.  JAPAN'S FDI IN TRANSPORT 
4.1  Japan's FDI in ASEAN’s Transport Sector 
Transport services under Japanese BOP classification includes railway services, road 
passenger transport services, road freight transport services, maritime transport services, air 
transport services, storage and warehouse services, and auxiliary transport services. Such 
coverage is roughly the same as transport services and logistics services under most 
services liberalization schemes and plans based on the W120 classification  (Services 
Sectoral Classification List prepared by World Trade Organization (WTO)  secretariat: 
MTN.GNS/W/120).
8
As we have seen, transport is the second largest sector in Japan's FDI in ASEAN among the 
services sub-sectors, after the finance and insurance sub-sector. Japan's overall FDI in 
transport has been rising since 2005, but it increased more dramatically in 2009. Figure 4 
shows that the value in 2009 (137 billion yen) is more than 70 times as high as in 2005 (1.9 
billion yen).  
 Thus, it is important to analyze the transport sectors and the logistics 
sectors together.  
                                                 
8 Note that W 120 does not have a sub-category of logistics services.  ADBI Working Paper 267    Hamanaka 
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Source: Author’s calculation based on Japan’s BOP statistics (various issues) 
While Japan's transport FDI in Singapore recorded negative values (a decrease in Japan's 
assets in Singapore) in 2005, it recovered considerably in 2006, yielding a growing trend in 
FDI. Since 2006, Singapore’s share has been dominant in Japan's FDI in ASEAN’s transport 
sector. Singapore had a share of roughly 80% in 2006–2008, reaching more than 98% in 
2009, and the concentration of investments in Singapore continues in the first half of 2010. 
Thailand is the second largest recipient of Japan's FDI in the transport sector, but its share is 
far behind that of Singapore. Moreover, the absolute amount of Japan's FDI in  ASEAN 
countries other than Singapore in the transport sector has been declining in recent years. 
This means that there is already a notable Singapore Shift and the trend is becoming more 
prevalent in the transport sector.  
4.2  Examples of Southeast Asian Operations of Japanese 
Logistics/Transport Companies 
There have been many reported cases of Japanese companies following a Singapore Shift 
in terms of their investments in ASEAN. The typical case is the establishment of Regional 
Operating Headquarters (ROH) in Singapore to cover the entire ASEAN region. In cases like 
this, a commercial presence in Singapore enables these companies to provide logistics 
services, not only domestically in Singapore, but also in other ASEAN countries across 
borders. Below are illustrative examples of Japanese companies that largely operate their 
businesses in Asia via Singapore.  
Nippon Express Co., Ltd. The ROH for Asia and Oceania of the largest Japanese total 
transportation company, Nippon Express, has been located in Hong Kong, China. However, 
in May 2010 the company announced its decision to reorganize its institutional structure with 
a view to establishing its ROH for Southeast Asia and Oceania in Singapore, as a response 
to the rapid increase in sales in Asia.
9 The ROH in Hong Kong, China will cover the East 
Asia region (mainly PRC). According to the press release issued by Nippon Express, while 
its overseas sales increased by 139% over the past decade, sales in the Asian region 
surged by 276% over the same period. Nippon Express explains that business needs in the 
PRC and ASEAN are different, and focusing on Southeast Asia by means of the ROH is 
necessary. Since 2007, Nippon Express has also utilized Singapore as a logistics hub for 
transport between Japan and India.
10
Yamato Transport Co., Ltd. The second largest Japanese total transportation company, 
Yamato Transport, also recently decided to establish ROH for the ASEAN region in 
  
                                                 
9 See: http://www.nittsu.co.jp/press/2010/20100409-1.html 





Mitsubishi Logistics Co., Ltd.  The largest Japanese logistics company, Mitsubishi 
Logistics (Mitsubishi Soko), is also expanding its business in Asia by establishing a logistics 
base in Singapore.
 Singapore Yamato was transformed into Yamato Asia in November 2009. The 
plan was that Yamato Asia would develop an express parcel business, in particular "B to C" 
business in Singapore as well as in other ASEAN countries. The parcel business has been 
expanding substantially due to a strong increase in mail-order purchases. Using the services 
it will offer, Yamato Transport expects that Japanese retailers specializing in the mail-order 
business will begin operations in Southeast Asia in the near future.  
12
4.3  Liberalization of Transport Sectors in ASEAN Countries 
 In December 2009, the Singaporean subsidiary of Mitsubishi Logistics 
(Mitsubishi Logistics Singapore Pte. Ltd.) merged with Singaporean logistic supplier Pioneer 
Express International. The press release of the former explains that the plan is to utilize 
Singapore as the center of its logistics network in Southeast Asia. Together with its Chinese 
subsidiary, Mitsubishi Logistics Singapore expects to expand the logistics business of the 
group of Mitsubishi Logistics in Asia.  
There are several reasons for the Singapore Shift in the transport sector. First, the transport 
and logistics market in ASEAN is rapidly integrating. In particular, logistics is a priority 
integration sector under the ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services (AFAS). In 2007, a 
formal agreement on the ASEAN Sectoral Integration Protocol for the Logistics Services 
Sector was concluded in Cebu, Philippines. The logistics liberalization scheme of ASEAN 
mainly covers the following sub-sectors: (a) Railway transport (central product classification 
[CPC]7112); (b) Road transport (CPC7123); (c) Maritime transport (CPC 7212, 7213); (d) 
Cargo handling (CPC 741); (e) Storage and warehousing (CPC 742); (f) Transport agency 
(CPC 743); (g) Postal and courier (CPC 7512); and (h) Packaging (CPC 876).  
Under the agreement, ASEAN members committed to completing the liberalization of those 
sectors in a timely manner. Mode 1 (cross-border supply of services)  and Mode 2 
(consumption abroad)  should be fully liberalized by 2013. For Mode 3  (services trade 
through a commercial presence), the plan is to increase the foreign equity cap to 49% by 
2008, to 51% by 2010, and to 70% by 2013. In 2015, 100% commercial presence of foreign-
owned logistics entities will be allowed. This means that logistics-related investment should 
be completely free of restrictions by 2015 within ASEAN, enabling entities to provide logistics 
services to ASEAN countries by establishing a commercial presence in any one ASEAN 
country. This scheme of integrating logistics services in ASEAN explains why the region is 
fast becoming an attractive market for Japanese companies and why Japan’s FDI in ASEAN 
in transport has increased overall. However, this does not fully explain why Japanese 
companies choose Singapore as their investment destination, which suggests the Singapore 
Shift phenomenon is part of the explanation.  
Second, Singapore has reformed its regulatory framework in the logistics sector and has 
conducted  a  thorough liberalization of  the sector.
13
                                                 
11 See: 
 Since then Singapore has been 
attempting to attract international logistics suppliers to achieve its goal of being ASEAN’s 
regional transport and logistics hub and the country has allowed full foreign ownership in the 
primary logistics sub-sectors (freight transport agency services, and storage and warehouse 
services). Among ASEAN countries, apart from Singapore, only Lao PDR and Cambodia 
allow full foreign ownership in the primary logistics sectors. In contrast, the level of openness 
in the logistics sector of Thailand, for example, is not comparable with Singapore, despite 
the Thai government’s claim that Thailand is ASEAN’s  logistics hub. Under the Foreign 
Business Act enforced in 2000,  the  Thai government restricts business  operations  of 
http://www.yamato-hd.co.jp/news/h21/h21_59_01news.html 
12 See: http://www.mitsubishi-logistics.co.jp/news/2010/100114.html 
13 For a detailed analysis of Singapore’s maritime industry, see Kind and Strandenes (2002).  ADBI Working Paper 267    Hamanaka 
 
11 
majority foreign-owned companies, which is applicable to most transport and logistics 
services. Moreover, Thailand’s plan to open up its logistics sectors to other ASEAN 
members is to just follow the liberalization schedule under the AFAS logistics framework. 
Majority foreign ownership will only be allowed in 2010. The foreign equity cap is due to be 
increased to 70% in 2013, and full foreign ownership will be permitted in 2015. In the case of 
the Philippines, the government maintains strict foreign equity cap regulations  on public 
utilities/services including various transport services, which is stated in the  republic’s 
constitutional provisions. Foreign equity participation in public utilities  in the Philippines 
should be no higher than 40%.  
Third, Singapore has committed to maintain its liberal regulatory regime by making 
commitments under the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA)  with Japan to  a 
considerable degree compared  with  Thailand or the Philippines.
14  While Singapore's 
transport/logistics commitment at the WTO/General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) 
negotiations has been relatively weak, its commitments under the Japan-Singapore 
Economic Partnership Agreement (JSEPA), signed in 2002, are very substantial. Whereas 
Singapore’s GATS commitments in transport services are limited to three sub-sectors
15, its 
commitments under JSEPA cover almost all sub-sectors with the notable exception of air 
passenger  transport. In contrast, Thailand's transport services commitments under  the 
Japan-Thailand Economic Partnership Agreement (JTEPA) signed in 2007 are not at all 
comprehensive.
16
                                                 
14 Thailand is chosen because the country has a strong desire to establish itself as the logistics hub of ASEAN. 
Theoretically speaking, the Philippines has a geographical advantage in that it serves as Japan’s gateway to 
ASEAN because of its east-end location in the ASEAN region (for example, Fedex uses Manila as a regional 
hub, though its operations in the Philippines have been shrinking).   
 Its coverage  is far more limited than Singapore’s commitments under 
JSEPA. Thailand excludes critical sub-sectors for  the  logistics industry,  such as freight 
transport agency services (CPC748). Thailand’s schedule in critical logistics and transport 
sectors  usually maintains the 49% foreign equity cap restriction (e.g.,  maritime freight 
transport  [CPC 7212]) in line with its Foreign Business Act,  and also includes several 
restrictions in Mode 3 (the form of commercial presence, nationality requirement, etc.). The 
only selling point of the JTEPA is that the Thai government allows foreign majority ownership 
in logistics consulting services (part of CPC 86509), but the liberalization of this sub-sector 
alone does not address actual commercial needs. The coverage of the Philippines’ 
commitment under the Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement (JPEPA), on the 
other hand, is as broad as Singapore’s, except regarding commitments in internal waterways 
transport, even though scheduling for the Philippines’ transport sub-sectors are “standstill” 
commitments. However, the Philippines does have a 40% foreign equity cap restriction in 
many of its Mode 3 commitments. 
15 Singapore’s current GATS commitments in transport include CPC7212 and CPC745 only.  
16 One of the few successes is that majority ownership via Japanese capital is allowed in the logistics sector, but 




Table 2: Transport Commitments of Singapore, Thailand, and the Philippines in EPAs 
Sectors or sub-sectors  JSEPA  JTEPA  JPEPA 
A. Maritime 
Transport 
Services   
 
a. Passenger transport (7211)    X  X  X 
b. Freight transport (7212)    X  X  X 
c. Rental of vessels with crew (7213)         
d. Maintenance and repair of vessels (8868**)    X    X 
e. Pushing and towing services (7214)  X  X  X 
f. Supporting services for maritime transport (745**)  X  X  X 
B. Internal 
Waterways 
Transport   
a. Passenger transport (7221)    X     
b. Freight transport (7222)    X     
c. Rental of vessels with crew (7223)    X     
d. Maintenance and repair of vessels (8868**)     X     
e. Pushing and towing services (7224)    X     
f. Supporting services for internal waterway transport (745**)      X     
C. Air  
Transport  
Services   
 
a. Passenger transport (731)         
b. Freight transport (732)         
c. Rental of aircraft with crew (734)    X     
d. Maintenance and repair of aircraft (8868**)    X  X  X 
e. Supporting services for air transport (746)  X  X   
D. Space Transport (733)  X     




a. Passenger transport (7111)    X    X 
b. Freight transport (7112)    X    X 
c. Pushing and towing services (7113)    X     
d. Maintenance and repair of rail transport equipment (8868**)    X  X   
e. Supporting services for rail transport services (743)  X  X  X 




a. Passenger transport (7121+7122)  X    X 
b. Freight transport (7123)  X  X  X 
c. Rental of commercial vehicles with operator (7124)  X  X  X 
d. Maintenance and repair of road transport equipment 
(6112+8867)     
X     
e. Supporting services for road transport services (744)  X     
G. Pipeline  
Transport 
a. Transport of fuels (7131)    X    X 
b. Transport of other goods (7139)  X    X 
H. Services  
auxiliary to  
all modes of  
Transport   
a. Cargo-handling services (741)        X 
b. Storage and warehouse services (742)    X  X  X 
c. Freight transport agency services (748)    X    X 
d. Other (749)       
I. Other Transport Services       
Note: ** indicates that the service specified constitutes only a part of the total range of activities covered by the CPC 
concordance. 
Source: Author’s compilation 
In summary, given the high degree of a Singapore Shift in the transport sector, despite the 
fact that other ASEAN countries also pursue attracting FDI in their respective transport 
sectors to a certain degree, it can be inferred that bilateral investment liberalization is critical 
in explaining services FDI in Singapore. It is likely that inflows of transport FDI to Singapore 
will partly crowd out FDI in  other ASEAN members. Japanese companies will typically 
choose a relatively liberalized economy as an investment destination to supply services all 
over ASEAN.  
In light of the above, Singapore’s regulation of the transport and logistics industry is relatively 
liberal (Mode 3) compared with other ASEAN countries and  is bound by high levels of 
commitments under JSEPA. Thailand’s regulation is slightly more liberal than that of the 
Philippines, but its commitment under JTEPA is relatively weak, leaving a large policy space 
for the Thai authorities to maneuver in. The quality of the Philippines’ binding commitments 
under JPEPA is relatively higher in the sense that no policy space is  afforded between 
commitments and actual regulations (standstill commitments). Nevertheless, these services 
sectors are highly-regulated by the government as stipulated in the constitution of the 
Philippines, which is also reflected under JPEPA commitments in the transport sector. ADBI Working Paper 267    Hamanaka 
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Meanwhile, the logistics sector will only be fully liberalized within ASEAN under the AFAS 
Logistics Scheme, including all modes of services supply, by 2015. As a result of this, many 
Japanese companies choose Singapore as a services investment destination in its role as a 
regional hub.  
5.  FINANCE AND INSURANCE  
5.1  Japan’s Finance and Insurance Sector FDI in ASEAN  
Figure 5 shows  Japan’s FDI in finance and insurance in  ASEAN countries. While it is 
volatile, the level is high. As we have seen, Japan’s FDI in the finance and insurance sector 
is becoming as large as its FDI in transport machinery and electric machinery. What should 
be noted here is that there is no dominant recipient of Japan’s FDI in terms of share as far 
as the finance and insurance sector is concerned. The largest recipient has frequently 
changed over time—Thailand in 2005; Singapore in 2006, 2007, and 2009; and Viet Nam in 
2008. Singapore’s share is slightly higher than that of other countries based on the average 
share in 2005–2009, but we cannot say that Singapore has the majority share, unlike in the 
case of the transport sector. Indonesia’s financial sector is also a constant recipient of large 
amounts of FDI from Japan, although it has not been the leading recipient in any single year. 
In 2005–2009, on average, Singapore and Indonesia belonged to the first group. Malaysia, 
Thailand, and Viet Nam were in the second group, although the difference between the two 
groups is not very substantial. The Philippines’ share is very small compared with that of the 
others.  




























Source: Author’s calculation based on Japan’s BOP statistics (various issues) 
 
5.2  Examples of Southeast Asian Operations of Japanese 
Financial Institutions  
This section gives an account of three illustrative examples of Japanese companies that 
have substantial overseas business expansion strategies in banking, insurance,  and 
securities in Asia. Because Japan’s domestic market is shrinking, Japanese financial 
institutions need to increase profits  from their operations in other parts of Asia. Such a 
strategy is particularly important for the second or third largest financial institutions in the 
Japanese market in terms of their share of the domestic market.  
Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ, Ltd. Japan’s largest commercial bank, Tokyo-Mitsubishi 
UFJ Bank, has strengthened its business operations in Asia. In October 2006, the bank 
invested in  the  CIMB Group, the second largest financial services provider in Malaysia. ADBI Working Paper 267    Hamanaka 
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While  Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ’s share  holding  was  limited to 1.1% at that time, it soon 
increased to 4.5% in February 2007.
17 Meanwhile, in November 2006, Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ 
Bank,  together with ACOM (Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ Bank’s subsidiary specialized in 
consumer finance),  announced  its  plan to merge with  Indonesia’s Bank Nusantara 
Parahyangan Tbk (Bank PNB) in order to enter the loan business as well as the consumer 
finance business in Indonesia.
18
Mitsui Sumitomo Insurance Co., Ltd. The second largest Japanese accident insurance 
company, Mitsui Sumitomo Insurance, has been actively engaged in its overseas operations 
in Asia, in particular. Because the leading accident insurance company in Japan—Tokyo 
Maritime Insurance—dominates the domestic market in Japan with a strong profit base, 
Mitsui Sumitomo Insurance needs to expand its overseas businesses to be able to compete 
with Tokyo Maritime. In fact, the company’s overseas premium income recorded a sharp 
increase in recent years (Table 3), with one third of the increase (2001FY–2007FY) in the 
company’s total premium income being earned in Asia. The company’s overseas business 
plan is to target half of its sales in Asia, 30% in Europe, and 20% in the US.
 Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ held 20% of the total share of Bank 
PNB, while ACOM held 55.4%. 
19
Table 3: Mitsui Sumitomo’s Premium Income in Asia-Pacific 
   
  2001FY  2007FY 
Amount  Share  Amount  Share 
Taipei,China  15  7.0  231  21.9 
Malaysia  56  26.2  197  18.7 
Singapore  35  16.4  137  13.0 
Thailand  28  13.1  137  13.0 
Hong Kong, China  20  9.3  106  10.0 
India  0  0.0  90  8.5 
Indonesia  34  15.9  49  4.6 
Philippines  11  5.1  36  3.4 
PRC  5  2.3  27  2.6 
Australia  6  2.8  19  1.8 
Viet Nam  3  1.4  5  0.5 
Republic of Korea  0  0.0  19  1.8 
Total  214  100.0  1,055  100.0 
Source: Toyo Keizai
20
Based on the company’s policy to establish subsidiaries in all ASEAN countries where 
foreign general insurers are permitted to get a license, Mitsui Sumitomo purchased 25% of 
shares in Asia Insurance (Cambodia) Limited in 2004. This was Mitsui Sumitomo’s eighth 
local subsidiary in Asia. In August 2008, Mitsui Sumitomo established its first fully-owned 
local subsidiary in Viet Nam, the first 100% Japanese-owned accident insurance company 
approved by the Vietnamese government.
 
21
                                                 
17  See: 
 In April 2009, Mitsui Sumitomo Insurance also 
established a subsidiary in Lao PDR, the first Japanese insurance subsidiary in the country. 
Mitsui Sumitomo holds 51% of the shares while the Lao Finance Ministry owns 49%. This 
was achieved soon after the Lao PDR government liberalized the establishment of insurance 
subsidiaries in 2007. Mitsui Sumitomo Insurance’s business expansion in more developed 
ASEAN countries is also significant. For example, in June 2010, MSIG Insurance (Malaysia) 
merged with Malaysia’s Hong Leong Assurance Bernard, becoming the second largest 
http://www.mufg.jp/ir/presentation/backnumber/pdffile/slides100214.pdf; 
http://www.jetro.go.jp/jfile/report/05001636/05001636_001_BUP_0.pdf 
18 See: http://www.bk.mufg.jp/news/news2006/pdf/news1128.pdf   
19 See: http://www.nsjournal.jp/column/detail.php?id=170865&dt=2009-08-06  
20 Available at: http://www.toyokeizai.net/business/strategy/detail/AC/094ae7dfdbea1d1d22b5cd1d8c4c488c/ 
21 Since 1997, the company has been operating an insurance business in Viet Nam through the United Insurance 
Company of Viet Nam, a joint company with Bao Ming. ADBI Working Paper 267    Hamanaka 
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player in the market. Mitsui Sumitomo will hold 70% of the shares of the newly-transformed 
MSIG Insurance (Malaysia), while Hong Leong will hold 30%.  
Daiwa Securities Group Inc. The second largest securities group in Japan,  Daiwa 
Securities, also decided to strengthen its commercial bases in Asia. In November 2009, 
Daiwa announced to increase capital resources allocated to its local subsidiaries in Asia, 
from 90 billion yen to 190 billion yen. While some functions and operations originally 
assigned in Tokyo will be moved to its subsidiary in Hong Kong, China, the company also 
plans to establish new local subsidiaries in Malaysia and Indonesia, where Daiwa is yet to 
establish a commercial presence. Daiwa’s goal is to achieve a five-fold increase in sales in 
Asia within 2 years.  
5.3  Liberalization of the Finance and Insurance Sector in ASEAN 
Countries 
Given the importance of financial services for economic development, ASEAN members 
acknowledge the significance of liberalizing the financial services sectors under the AFAS. 
The AFAS package concluded in 1998 included a select number of financial sub-sectors, but 
coverage was not substantial. In 2002, finance ministers agreed to start negotiations 
exclusively on financial services (the  second financial package), followed by the third 
financial package concluded in 2004, and finally the fourth financial package concluded in 
2008.
22
The ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint adopted in 2007 still does not contain concrete 
steps for liberalization in the financial services sector. The blueprint states that “liberalization 
measures of the financial services sector should allow members to ensure orderly financial 
sector development and maintenance of financial and socioeconomic stability”, emphasizing 
the importance of national policy objectives. It is clear that actions to be taken in completing 
the economic community blueprint imply that liberalization of the financial services sector 
under the AFAS is not aimed at creating a common market. ASEAN’s commitments in 
financial services in the blueprint can be summarized as follows:  
 However, the resulting level of openness of financial services within ASEAN remains 
insignificant.  
•  Progressively liberalize restrictions in sub-sectors or modes as identified by each 
member country by 2015; 
•  Progressively liberalize restrictions in the remaining sub-sectors or modes, which are 
not identified under “pre-agreed flexibilities” by 2020. 
Other individual ASEAN members still maintain restrictive regulatory frameworks in the field 
of financial services  while Singapore, Indonesia,  and Malaysia have relatively liberalized 
financial services sectors. This means that the problem is not limited to the quality of 
commitments, but includes the reform of current restrictive regulations within these countries 
as well. For example, in Singapore the government formally lifted a foreign equity cap in the 
banking sector.
23
                                                 
22 For an analysis of ASEAN’s services liberalization scheme, see Hamanaka (2009).  
 The insurance sector in Singapore is also open to full foreign ownership. In 
Indonesia, 99% foreign ownership is permitted in the banking sector, while the foreign equity 
cap is pegged at 80% in the case of insurance. Malaysia boldly instituted reform in financial 
regulation in 2009. The foreign equity cap was increased from 49% to 70% for domestic 
Islamic banks, investment banks, and insurance companies.Meanwhile, in Thailand, 
restrictions on the foreign equity cap and foreign board member shares remained at 25% for 
financial institutions (both banking and insurance) until 2008 when the government increased 
the foreign equity cap to 49% in August 2008. However, increasing foreign ownership from 
anywhere between 25% and 49% will still require prior approval from the central bank of 
Thailand. In the Philippines, the Act Liberalizing the Entry and Scope of Operations of 
23 However, it publicly announced that it will not allow foreigners to take over the three local financial institutions.  ADBI Working Paper 267    Hamanaka 
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Foreign Banks in the Philippines restricts foreign equity participation to 60% in banking 
sectors as long as foreign banks meet qualification requirements
24
Table 4: Foreign Equity Cap in Financial Sectors in ASEAN Countries 
, while participation is 
limited to 40% otherwise. Full foreign ownership is allowed in the insurance sector in the 
Philippines (see Table 4).  
  Singapore  Indonesia   Malaysia  Philippines   Thailand 
Banking  100%  99%  49%>70%  60%/40%  25>49% 
Insurance  100%  80%  49%>70%  100%  25>49% 
ASEAN countries do not have ambitious commitments in financial services under their EPAs 
with Japan, except for Singapore. Under the JTEPA signed in 2007, Thailand’s schedule 
included  a foreign equity cap of 25% in Mode 3 in both banking and insurance. The 
Philippines’ commitments in financial services under JPEPA is limited to the banking sector 
and does not include commitments in the insurance sector beyond the GATS, despite actual 
regulation allowing full foreign ownership.
25
Table 5: Commitments on Foreign Equity Cap under EPAs with Japan 
 Meanwhile, Singapore’s commitments  under 
JSEPA  do not impose any restrictions (“none”  commitment)  in the insurance sector and 
Singapore does not have a foreign equity cap in the banking sector (see Table 5). 
  Singapore  Indonesia   Malaysia  Philippines   Thailand 
Banking  None  49%  30%  60%  25% 
Insurance  None  49%  30%  51%  25% 
In summary, it is safe to assume that the financial services sector will not be fully liberalized 
even among ASEAN members in the near future. Many ASEAN countries maintain a 
restrictive regulatory environment, unlike in the case of transport and logistics. Therefore, a 
Japanese financial institution needs to obtain licenses from the respective government of the 
ASEAN country in which it wishes to start a business. For the financial services sector, using 
a commercial presence in one ASEAN country as a strategy to supply services all over 
ASEAN is not a viable option. As a result, there is no Singapore Shift in the case of financial 
services.  
The actual level of deregulation appears to be more important as a determining factor for the 
bilateral investment than the level of commitments. For example, Japan’s FDI in the financial 
services sector in the Philippines is negligible although the Philippines’ commitments are 
more comprehensive  than  the  commitments of most other ASEAN countries, except for 
Singapore. The problem is that the Philippines’ actual regulatory environment is more 
restrictive than that of other ASEAN countries. The fact that Thailand receives Japanese FDI 
in the financial services sector to a certain degree even though its level of deregulation and 
its commitments are insignificant implies that other factors such as market size and 
manufacturing FDI are also important.  
6.  POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF THE SINGAPORE SHIFT 
Sector-level comparative analyses of Japan’s FDI in ASEAN reveal that Japan’s outward 
FDI is concentrated in the most FDI-friendly country in ASEAN, namely Singapore, which 
enables Japan to provide services throughout the ASEAN  region in some services sub-
sectors. Some Japanese companies also use Singapore as a regional hub so that services 
can be provided all over the ASEAN region  by establishing a commercial presence in 
                                                 
24 Qualifications include wide ownership, public listing in the country of origin and global/national rankings. See 
information available at the USTR website.  
http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/reports/2010/NTE/2010_NTE_Philippines_final.pdf  
25 The  Philippines’ GATS schedule in the insurance sector (51% foreign equity participation) is reflected in 
JPEPA.  ADBI Working Paper 267    Hamanaka 
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Singapore. Such inclination toward the Singapore Shift is strong in transport services, but 
not evident in the case of financial services.  
One important policy implication of the Singapore Shift is that countries need to minimize 
restrictions on services FDI from outside the region, if services trade is liberalized within a 
region under an FTA or EPA. This is because otherwise outside investors would simply 
choose another country in the region to supply services to that country.
 26
Furthermore, competition to provide a favorable investment environment among regional 
economies is not limited to minimizing restrictions on FDI, but  also includes granting 
investment incentives. If one member country of a regional agreement provides investment 
incentives to the companies and business entities outside the region, other member 
countries may also need to offer similar incentives to companies outside the region to avoid 
crowding-out effects. Because services trade is liberalized within a region, it is natural for 
companies outside the region to choose the most FDI-friendly county in the region as its 
investment destination to supply services across the region. What should be noted is that 
simply providing incentives to attract FDI without  liberalizing the investment regime or 
minimizing the restrictions on FDI is not an effective investment policy. Countries should 
provide investment incentives in addition to liberalizing FDI and ensure that commitments to 
ensure a liberal investment regime are made under regional economic agreements or GATS.  
 When FTA or EPA 
members decide to liberalize trade and investment in a particular services sector where the 
Singapore Shift may occur, it is important to liberalize the sectors for outsiders as well.  
In addition to transport services, services such as communications (courier and value-added 
telecommunication) and distribution (wholesale, in particular) can be provided across the 
ASEAN region by establishing a commercial presence in just one ASEAN country. The 
actual extent of this kind of shift occurring in those services sub-sectors will need careful 
examination. Figure 6 presents the amount and share received by each ASEAN country of 
Japan’s FDI in the distribution sector. While there are no disaggregated figures for wholesale 
and retail, Singapore’s share in Japan’s distribution services FDI in ASEAN appears to be on 
an upward trend.  



































Source: Author’s calculation based on Japan’s BOP statistics (various issues) 
 
7.  CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH AGENDAS 
The recent proliferation of services agreements has drastically changed the restrictions and 
conditions on Japan’s FDI in ASEAN. On the one hand, services trade and investment have 
been liberalized within the ASEAN region, and will eventually be completely liberalized within 
                                                 
26 See footnote 2.  ADBI Working Paper 267    Hamanaka 
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the ASEAN region in the coming years for some sub-sectors. On the other hand, services 
trade and investment between Japan and individual ASEAN countries have  also  been 
liberalized under their respective bilateral EPAs, but to differing degrees.  
In the case of transport, liberalization of trade and investment within ASEAN has already 
reached a considerable level, and will be fully liberalized in the near future. Many Japanese 
companies choose Singapore as an FDI destination because the country continues to have 
the most liberal regulatory environment in the transport sector, and has committed to 
maintaining  such an environment under its EPA with Japan. The strategy of Japanese 
companies is to supply transport services throughout ASEAN through a commercial 
presence in Singapore. As a result, a considerable degree of Singapore Shift  can be 
observed in this industry.  
By contrast, in the case of financial services there is no clear evidence of a Singapore Shift. 
This is mainly because financial services have not and will not be fully liberalized even 
among ASEAN members in the near future. To supply financial services, Japanese financial 
institutions need to obtain licenses and establish a commercial presence in each ASEAN 
country. Singapore and Indonesia were each able to attract a large amount of Japan’s FDI in 
the financial services sector, but their shares are not very dominant. The relatively large 
amount of financial FDI flows to Singapore and Indonesia can be explained by the fact that 
these two countries maintain relatively liberal regulatory regimes, particularly in terms of the 
foreign equity cap on financial institutions. While Thailand maintains a high level of restriction 
on FDI in financial services, and its commitment in the financial services sector under JTEPA 
is insignificant, the country still attracts a certain amount of financial services FDI from 
Japan, perhaps because of its large accumulation of manufacturing FDI from Japan. 
However, Japan’s financial services FDI in the Philippines is negligible, even though the 
Philippines’  regulatory environment and commitments are more favorable than those of 
Thailand.  
The main focus of this paper has been the analysis of Japan’s FDI in ASEAN with a special 
reference to Singapore. The question worth considering at this stage is whether the 
phenomenon of the Singapore Shift can be generalized. One way to test this is to analyze 
Japan’s FDI in a region other than ASEAN that has a regional economic agreement covering 
services and investment within the region as well as bilateral agreements between each 
country in that region and Japan, and to examine if a shift of FDI to one country occurs, as in 
the case of the Singapore Shift in ASEAN. However, in reality there is no region other than 
ASEAN that would be suitable for testing this hypothesis. Another way to critically test if the 
argument can be generalized—which appears more interesting and effective—is to analyze 
other countries’ services FDI in ASEAN. Korea for example would be a good candidate for 
analytical study given that it is an investment exporter  and has economic agreements 
covering services and investment with each individual ASEAN country. If a similar 
phenomenon can be observed in Korea’s FDI in ASEAN, a thorough examination of the 
determinant factors of such a shift can be studied more fruitfully. If this phenomenon is 
unique to Japan, we should find factors peculiar to Japan that lead to the Singapore Shift in 
Japan’s FDI.  
Another important follow-up research question is related to methodology. It is quite difficult to 
conduct regression analyses to assess the precise impact of each factor on bilateral services 
FDI flows at the sector-level, due mainly to gaps in investment data and the difficulty of 
including the level of investment restriction (in the context of bilateral agreements) in the 
explanatory variables. In-depth company-level case studies based on corporate executive 
interviews seem to be an effective alternative method to assess the decisive factors of 
services investment decisions, and to identify concrete business models applied in their 
Southeast Asian operations. In particular, the manner in which Japanese and other 
countries’ companies utilize their Singapore base to provide services to other ASEAN 
countries and whether Singapore, acting as a regional hub, actually crowds out operations in 
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